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ABSTRACT 
On a daily basis, travelers face invasions of privacy from body 
scanners and pat-downs at airports. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) possesses extensive discretion in determining 
which security measures to use. However, the Supreme Court has
required that passenger screening not be more extensive or invasive 
than needed to protect security. Passengers, states, and scholars 
have objected to the TSA’s current security methods of Advanced 
Imaging Technology (AIT), also known as body scanners, and full 
body pat-downs as being highly invasive. However, the TSA has 
continued to use these methods and has even recently issued a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking pertaining to its use of AIT as a primary 
screening method at airports. 
While the TSA was created to enhance airport security in 
response to the tragic events of 9/11, Congress surely did not intend 
to give the TSA carte blanche in the invasiveness of its security 
methods. Although the Court currently balances the necessity of a 
search against the offensiveness of the resulting intrusion to 
determine its constitutionality, this test is insufficient to protect 
privacy. Simply because a method is justified under this test does not 
necessitate the conclusion that the sacrifice of privacy is worth the 
perhaps minimal increases in security or that Congress should 
permit the TSA to use that method with unbridled discretion. Since 
the TSA can so deeply invade the privacy of Americans on a daily 
basis, Congress must seriously consider the amount of leeway it
gives the TSA. Overall, Congress ought not abdicate its 
responsibility to the American people by handing its oversight 
responsibilities of the TSA over to courts, which afford great 
deference to the TSA. 
A congressional solution should involve increasing
transparency, exercising more oversight, and imposing more explicit 
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limitations on the TSA’s power. Most importantly, Congress should 
require that the TSA carry out its mandates without substantially 
infringing on privacy rights. Congress should also require the TSA to 
conduct a broad cost-benefit analysis for its security measures, 
balancing the increased security benefits of the new security 
measures against the monetary, privacy, and efficiency costs. Even if 
people then disagreed with the TSA’s determination under these new 
requirements, the result would be greater protections to privacy and 
greatly increased transparency of the TSA’s decisions upfront, rather 
than allowing the TSA to make decisions infringing on privacy and 
provide post hoc justifications for them when challenged in court. 
While some may argue that sacrifices to privacy are a necessary cost 
to achieve peace and safety, what is a life of security worth if that life 
is overrun with constant invasions of privacy by the very government 
created to protect American security and privacy?
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INTRODUCTION
When even Miss USA says that an airport security measure 
goes too far in trying to advance peace and safety, what kind of 
alarm bells should be ringing?1 Are Americans running afoul of 
Benjamin Franklin’s warning that “‘[t]hose [who] would give up 
their liberty for security deserve neither and lose both’”?2 In April of 
2011, former Miss USA Susie Castillo opted out of a body scan in a 
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1. See Susie Castillo, My TSA Pat Down Experience, SUSIE CASTILLO
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.susiecastillo.com/blog/2011/4/25/my-tsa-pat-down-
experience.html.
2. Id. (paraphrasing Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to 
the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242
(Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963) (“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to 
purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”)).
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Dallas airport and was subjected to a pat-down.3 Castillo later 
blogged about the incident: 
What bothered me most was when she ran the back of her hands down my 
behind, felt around my breasts, and even came in contact with my 
vagina! . . . The TSA employee at DFW touched my private area 4 times, 
going up both legs from behind and from the front, each time touching me 
there. Was I at my gynecologist’s office? No! This was crazy! I felt 
completely helpless and violated during the entire process (in fact, I still 
do), so I became extremely upset.4
As opined by the president of the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC), “No other country in the world subjects its air 
travelers to the combination of screening procedures that Americans 
are being asked to endure.”5
On a daily basis, travelers face invasions of privacy from body 
scanners and pat-downs at airports.6 The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has a lot of discretion in determining which 
security measures to use.7 If a measure is going to be so intrusive 
into individual privacy, the TSA at the very least should have a 
strong showing that such a measure increases security more than 
alternative methods would.8 Perhaps some methods go too far and 
even violate constitutional rights.9 In evaluating different security 
methods, it is important to remember that “[l]iberty—the freedom 
from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through 
insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs 
3. Former Miss USA Feels “Violated” by TSA Pat-Down, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42805551/ns/travel-
news/t/former-miss-usa-feels-violated-tsa-pat-down/#.UkW6ohatqfQ.
4. Castillo, supra note 1.
5. Marc Rotenberg, Body Scanners, Pat-Downs Violate Law and Privacy,
CNN (Nov. 19, 2010, 9:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
OPINION/11/17/rotenberg.scanners.privacy/index.html.
6. Id.
7. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), (f)(3), (f)(8) (2006). 
8. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973) (requiring 
“that the screening process [be] no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in 
the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives, 
[and] that it [be] confined in good faith to that purpose”). 
9. Id. (explaining that a screening process goes too far if it is more 
extensive or intensive than necessary); Brittany R. Stancombe, Comment, Fed Up 
with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment 
and TSA’s “Body Scanners” and “Pat-Downs,” 42 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 195, 210 
(2012) (arguing that advanced imaging technology (AIT) used as a primary search 
method may be unconstitutional). 
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too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can 
be as deadly as the shark.”10
When flight was not such a normal method of travel, perhaps
greater invasion of privacy was permissible because people could 
simply choose other, more common, methods of travel.11 However, 
now that flight is so standard and indispensable in this increasingly 
connected world, and as the TSA uses more intrusive security 
methods, a new evaluation of the rights implicated by security 
measures is necessary.12 A congressional solution should involve the 
exercise of more oversight and imposition of more explicit 
limitations on the TSA’s power; when the TSA uses more intrusive 
security measures, Congress should require the TSA to demonstrate 
10. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 
1989) (warning that airport security checks “are capable of great abuse,” “touch the 
lives of so many,” and “call[] for the greatest vigilance” by courts); Greg Star, 
Comment, Airport Security Technology: Is the Use of Biometric Identification 
Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
251, 265 (2002) (concluding that the government should use the “least invasive 
biometric measurements” in airport security). 
11. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 913 n.59 (“The airport search program is not an 
absolute bar to travel. Other means of transportation are available. Moreover, for the 
vast majority such a search entails at most a slight delay; it does not bar their 
intended flight.”). But see United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 
1974) (“While it may be argued there are often other forms of transportation 
available, it would work a considerable hardship on many air travelers to be forced 
to utilize an alternate form of transportation, assuming one exists at all.”).
12. See Former Miss USA Feels “Violated” by TSA Pat-Down, supra note 
3 (explaining that former Miss USA said she would use other methods of travel 
instead of flying, but then she could not do her job). Clearly, not all methods of 
travel are equal, particularly at such distances in this interconnected world and even 
within the United States. See David Bradley Olsen, Naked Body Scans and Full-
Body Pat-Downs: The Controversy Surrounding the TSA’s Enhanced Airport 
Screening Procedures, in ASPATORE SPECIAL REPORT: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL 
IMPACT OF AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT PASSENGER 
PROFILING AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PUBLIC 5, 8 (2011) (describing Alaska State 
Representative Sharon Cissna’s experience where she refused a full-body pat-down 
as “unreasonably invasive and unnecessary”). She was not allowed to get on the
airplane and had to return to Alaska “by other means, including one leg of the four-
day trip by boat.” Id. Further, the Second Circuit opined that making someone 
choose between flying to his destination and exercising his constitutional rights 
often seems like “a form of coercion, however subtle. While it may be argued there 
are often other forms of transportation available, it would work a considerable 
hardship on many air travelers to be forced to utilize an alternate form of 
transportation, assuming one exists at all.” Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806-07 & n.14 
(citation omitted).
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greater security benefits, and Congress should not allow invasion of 
privacy beyond that which actually increases safety.13
Part I of this Note discusses the different security measures that 
airports have used in the past and those that the TSA presently uses 
to screen passengers. Part II discusses the underlying federal 
statutory law, regulatory law, and constitutional privacy issues 
involved in TSA security measures. Part III analyzes the 
effectiveness and invasiveness of current and alternate security 
methods, and public policy arguments to support less or more 
invasive measures. Part IV presents how states and scholars have 
responded to the TSA and suggests that both have missed a 
necessary piece to solving this puzzle: congressional action directly 
limiting the TSA’s discretion. Part V concludes with a further 
emphasis on the need for the proposed reforms in this area to protect 
citizens’ privacy rights.
I. WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT? A LOOK AT DIFFERENT 
SECURITY MEASURES
Airports and the TSA have used a variety of security measures 
to screen passengers over the years, each met with varying levels of 
resistance.14 In particular, the TSA has used magnetometers,15 pat-
downs,16 and body scanners.17 Before evaluating the rights that these 
measures implicate and the powers that the TSA has, it is helpful to 
understand what each security measure actually entails.
One of the older techniques for airport security is the 
magnetometer, also known as a walk-through metal detector 
(WTMD), which is activated when a passenger who walks through it 
has metal on his or her person.18 Magnetometers were originally only 
set off by ferrous metals, but the newer models also detect non-
ferrous metals.19 Once someone activates a WTMD, security 
13. See infra Part V (proposing solutions that involve more congressional 
guidance and restrictions on the TSA).
14. See infra Section II.B (giving a background of constitutional challenges 
to different airport security methods in case law). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 22-33.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 34-43.
18. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 802 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974).
19. Id. Ferrous metals are those that contain iron while non-ferrous metals 
do not have iron. The Differences Between Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Scrap Metal,
ALTON MATERIALS (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.altonmaterials.com/the-differences-
between-ferrous-and-non-ferrous-scrap-metal/ (explaining the differences between 
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personnel often either use a portable magnetometer to wand over the 
passenger and find the metal object or ask the passenger to remove 
metal objects and walk through the magnetometer a second time.20 In 
some cases, activating the magnetometer once or twice could result 
in a frisk.21
Regarding frisks and pat-downs, in 1974, the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Albarado explained that “the typical airport frisk 
may be more in the nature of a ‘pat-down,’ involving only the patting 
of external clothing in the vicinity of pockets, belts or shoulders 
where a weapon such as a gun might be secreted.”22 In contrast, the 
court described a full frisk as where an officer feels “‘with sensitive 
fingers every portion of the [person’s] body’” and makes a thorough 
search “‘of the [person’s] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the 
groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down 
to the feet.’”23 In the past, the TSA only permitted its agents to 
perform pat-downs with the back of their hands as a secondary form 
of screening.24 In 2004, the TSA implemented procedures that made 
pat-downs more thorough in response to female passengers in Russia 
who concealed explosives on their torsos when boarding a plane.25
Further, since 2010, the TSA has allowed its agents conducting 
secondary screenings to use the front of their hands to pat-down 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals in further detail); see also The Difference Between 
Ferrous & Non-Ferrous Metals, ASM METAL RECYCLING, http://www.asm-
recycling.co.uk/services/metal-recycling/ferrous-non-ferrous.html (last visited Nov. 
17, 2014) (explaining the differences between ferrous and non-ferrous metals and 
giving examples of both types of metal). 
20. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 802 n.3. 
21. Id. For a detailed explanation of what an airport frisk entails, see infra
text accompanying notes 22-36.
22. 495 F.2d at 807. 
23. Id. (quoting L. L. Priar & T. F. Martin, Searching and Disarming 
Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 481, 481 (1954)).
24. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 188. 
25. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,291 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). 
Out of concern for similar occurrences in the United States, the TSA implemented 
more in depth pat-downs so that its officers would have a better opportunity to 
discover explosives concealed in a similar manner in the United States. Id.; see also
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OIG-06-10, REVIEW OF THE 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S USE OF PAT-DOWNS IN SCREENING 
PROCEDURES (REDACTED) 1 (2005), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/
assets/Mgmt/OIGr_06-10_Nov05.pdf (providing information on the TSA’s use of 
pat-downs at airports and explaining why the TSA enhanced these pat-downs in 
2004 after the explosion of Russian planes when women concealed the explosives 
under their clothing).
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passengers of the same gender as the inspecting agent.26 This policy 
changed when the TSA issued new standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) that included the use of body scanners and full-body pat-
downs.27 Explaining its change of policy, the TSA stated that pat-
downs assist the TSA in detecting concealed explosives.28 These 
enhanced pat-downs “allow an officer to feel the whole body and 
under clothes.”29 While this is a dramatic change in policy, “[t]he 
TSA issued the [new] SOP without any public comment or input”
and without making the SOP available to the public.30 In addition to 
using pat-downs as a secondary form of screening, passengers opting 
out of body scanners must also submit to a pat-down.31 Although
26. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 188.
27. Olsen, supra note 12, at 6.
28. Jim Barnett, TSA to Phase in New Pat-Down Procedures at Airports 
Nationwide, CNN (Oct. 29, 2010, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
TRAVEL/10/28/airline.security.pat.down/. When the TSA implemented its new 
SOP in 2010, it issued a press release, explaining that 
TSA is in the process of implementing new pat-down procedures at 
checkpoints nationwide as one of our many layers of security to keep the 
traveling public safe. Pat-downs are one important tool to help TSA 
detect hidden and dangerous items such as explosives. Passengers should 
continue to expect an unpredictable mix of security layers that include 
explosives trace detection, advanced imaging technology, canine teams, 
among others.
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Statement on New Pat-Down Procedures 
(Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2010/10/28/tsa-
statement-new-pat-down-procedures. 
29. Olsen, supra note 12, at 7; see also Hugo Martin, New TSA Pat-Down 
Procedure Expands Nationwide, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 1, 2010, 4:51 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2010/11/new-thorough-pat-down-
procedure-expands-nationwide.html (explaining that the new SOP permits TSA 
officers “to use their fingers and palms to feel and probe for hidden weapons and 
devices around sensitive body parts, such as the breast and groin areas”). The TSA 
first tested the enhanced pat-downs in Boston and Las Vegas airports and decided to 
expand the use of enhanced pat-downs to all U.S. airports in order to maintain public 
safety in traveling. See id.
30. Olsen, supra note 12, at 6. The TSA generally does not make its SOPs 
publically available. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 
F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). However, the TSA’s short press release stated that the 
goal of the new SOP was to keep the public safe. See Press Release, Transp. Sec. 
Admin., supra note 28. Similarly, the TSA did not use notice-and-comment 
rulemaking when it changed its policy to have AIT as a primary screening method 
for passengers at airports. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 2-3. However, the 
D.C. Circuit later required the TSA to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking 
because this change from magnetometers to AIT substantially affected privacy rights 
and because Americans should have had input into the agency’s decision. Id. at 5-6. 
31. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 188. 
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passengers are allowed to request a pat-down in private, many 
passengers are still uncomfortable with the level of intrusion and 
“have complained that their private areas, such as breasts and 
genitals, have been touched.”32 Indeed, the experience of former
Miss USA Susie Castillo sounds much more like the full frisk 
described in Albarado than the light pat-down that used to be more 
typical in an airport.33
In addition to more intrusive pat-downs, much of the recent 
controversy over the TSA’s security measures has involved body 
scanners, also referred to as whole body imaging (WBI) or advanced 
imaging technology (AIT).34 The two types of technologies used in 
body scanners are backscatter technology and millimeter-wave 
technology.35 AIT with backscatter technology delivers a “low 
intensity x-ray” onto a passenger’s body and takes a picture of the 
photon pattern “bouncing off of certain materials, revealing its 
shape” on the TSA monitor.36 Similarly, AIT with millimeter-wave 
technology “uses non-ionizing radiation in the radio wavelength area 
to bombard the body and record the bouncing of the waves from 
32. Id. at 188-89. 
33. Castillo, supra note 1; United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d 
Cir. 1974). In describing a full frisk, the Second Circuit indicated that “the ‘officer 
must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the [person’s] body. A thorough 
search must be made of the [person’s] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the 
groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’” 
Id. (quoting Priar & Martin, supra note 23, at 481). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 
(1968), the Court used this description of a full frisk and then stated that such a frisk 
“is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great 
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” 
34. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 6-7 (explaining that whole body imaging, 
body scanners, and automated imaging technology are all terms used for 
technologies that “use either backscatter X-ray or millimeter wave technology to 
produce detailed, three-dimensional images of the subject’s body through and under 
clothing, including private and sensitive areas of the body” and noting that 
opponents of whole body imaging describe the technology “as naked body scanners” 
and “an electronic strip search”). 
35. Victoria Sutton, Asking the Right Questions: Body Scanners, Is Salus 
Populi Supreme Lex the Answer?, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 443-44 (2013) 
(questioning whether the positive effect of AIT on national security interests 
outweighs the potentially negative effect of AIT on public health interests). For 
further information on how AIT works, see Jennifer LeVine, Note, Over-Exposed? 
TSA Scanners and the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
175, 176-78 (2011), as well as Julie Solomon, Comment, Does the TSA Have Stage 
Fright? Then Why Are They Picturing You Naked?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 652-62
(2008). 
36. Sutton, supra note 35, at 443-44. 
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materials or objects on the body.”37 While AIT used to generate 
detailed, passenger-specific pictures, the TSA presently utilizes 
millimeter-wave AIT with automated target recognition software 
(ATR),38 which removes passenger-specific images and instead 
displays the same generic outline for all passengers, automatically 
highlighting possible threats on that outline.39
Although the AIT at airports used to save detailed images of 
passengers, the TSA has since disabled this capacity in its AIT units, 
and the TSA agents are not allowed to bring photographic devices, 
including phones, with them into the screening room.40 Under the 
TSA’s procedures, a passenger steps into the AIT machine and raises 
her hands above her head as the machine generates a generic image 
and points out areas for further search.41 According to current 
protocols, a TSA agent in a different room views the image and 
indicates whether there is a need to pat-down, question, or further 
screen the passenger.42 However, if a passenger refuses to go through 
the body scanner, she will be patted down in the manner previously 
described.43
37. Id. at 444.
38. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 187.
39. Advanced Imaging Technology, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait (last 
modified Sept. 3, 2014). 
40. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 186. In the past, AIT could save the images 
it generated. See Jennifer S. Ellison & Marc Pilcher, Advanced Imaging Technology 
(AIT) Deployment: Legal Challenges and Responses, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 4 
(A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), 2012, at 4, 6-7. However, in 2007, Congress passed a statute 
that required the Secretary of Homeland Security to appoint a privacy officer to
“assur[e] that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections 
relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information.” 6 U.S.C. 
§ 142(a)(1) (Supp. I 2009). Because of this new mandate, the TSA privacy officer 
had to evaluate whether AIT with storage capacity eroded privacy by collecting or 
disclosing personal information. See id. As a result, the TSA decided to remove the 
storage capacity from AIT and set protocols in place to prevent the use of passenger 
images. See Ellison & Pilcher, supra, at 6-7.
41. Sutton, supra note 35, at 443. In contrast to a graphic image of the 
passenger with AIT alone, the image generated is only a generic outline when ATR 
is used. Advanced Imaging Technology, supra note 39.
42. Sutton, supra note 35, at 443. The TSA believes that it is less invasive 
of privacy when the TSA officer viewing the detailed body scan is not permitted to 
see the passenger in person, thus preserving anonymity. See Passenger Screening 
Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287, 18,294 (proposed Mar. 
26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
43. LeVine, supra note 35, at 178; see also supra text accompanying notes 
22-33.
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II. WHAT CAN THE TSA DO? FEDERAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES
Understanding the different methods that the TSA has used to 
screen passengers over the years is vital to fully comprehending the 
following discussion. In particular, this understanding is necessary 
for a proper assessment of the powers that Congress gave to the TSA 
over airport security and the constitutional challenges that people 
have brought against the TSA’s use of those powers via different 
security methods. As a backdrop for this discussion, it is important to 
bear in mind the very foundation of this great country—the United 
States Constitution. In particular, the Fourth Amendment provides
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated.”44 Because the TSA is conducting searches of 
passengers at airports, it is essential to remember this foundational 
right against unreasonable searches when examining the TSA’s
creation, mandates, regulations, and constitutional challenges.45
A. The TSA’s Creation, Authority, and Airport Security Regulations
The TSA was created after 9/1146 and was placed in charge of 
screening operations at airports.47 Congress directed the TSA to 
“develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to 
transportation security”48 and to “identify and undertake research and 
development activities necessary to enhance transportation 
security.”49 To carry out its functions, the TSA can “issue, rescind, 
and revise” regulations.50 In doing so, the TSA must consider 
“whether the costs of the regulation are excessive in relation to the 
enhancement of security the regulation will provide.”51 For purposes 
of this comparison, security is measured by estimating the monetary 
value of the number of lives that the particular security method 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. See id.
46. See Star, supra note 10, at 252 (explaining that the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was “a direct response to the events of 
September 11th and call[ed] for broad based security improvements”).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), (f)(3), (f)(8) (2006).
48. Id. § 114(f)(3).
49. Id. § 114(f)(8).
50. Id. § 114(l)(1).
51. Id. § 114(l)(3).
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would save.52 However, the Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security can waive this requirement if it is not feasible to calculate 
the number of lives saved or the value of those lives.53
Congress’s mandate in a 2007 statute has become important in 
the TSA context due to the use of AIT and its storage capacity.54 As 
per this statute, the Secretary of Homeland Security must appoint a 
privacy officer to “assur[e] that the use of technologies sustain, and 
do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and
disclosure of personal information.”55 Hence, the privacy officer 
must evaluate the TSA’s technologies that use personal 
information—like AIT that can store images of passengers who have 
gone through it—because the TSA may not erode privacy in the 
TSA’s use of such technology.56
In 2010, the TSA greatly increased its use of AIT and started 
using it for primary passenger screening after President Obama’s
Presidential Memorandum Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted 
Terrorist Attack, which mandated that the Department of Homeland 
Security “[a]ggressively pursue enhanced screening technology, 
protocols, and procedures . . . consistent with privacy rights and civil 
liberties.”57 After the TSA’s response to the President’s directive, 
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
71, § 101, 115 Stat. 597, 597 (2001) (dealing with the TSA’s creation). In its Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on AIT, the TSA conducted a cost–benefit 
analysis, calculating the costs of AIT deployment from 2008 to 2011 at 
$841,230,600 and estimating future costs in maintaining AIT from 2012 to 2015 at 
$1,532,279,200. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 
Fed. Reg. 18,287, 18,289-90 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 1540). The TSA also indicated that the benefits of AIT from increased security at 
airports are greater than the benefits from magnetometers, particularly in light of 
new threats from non-metallic explosives and weapons. Id. at 18,290. 
54. See Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 40, at 6-7 (explaining that AIT has the 
capacity to generate graphical images of passengers and the ability to store those 
images, although the TSA removed this storage capability and has protocols to 
prevent the use of those images).
55. 6 U.S.C. § 142(a)(1) (Supp. I 2009).
56. See id.; see also Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 40, at 6-7. 
57. Press Release, The White House, Presidential Memorandum Regarding 
12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-
12252009-attempted-terrorist-attack (concluding that the TSA must take “immediate 
actions . . . to enhance the security of the American people”). President Obama 
stated that the TSA needed to enact changes to its security at airports because of the 
“inherent systemic weaknesses and human errors revealed” by the preceding events. 
Id.; see also Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 40, at 4; infra text accompanying notes 
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Congress, in 2012, limited the TSA’s use of AIT by requiring the 
TSA to equip all AIT for screening passengers with ATR, which 
“produces a generic image of the individual being screened that is 
the same as the images produced for all other screened 
individuals.”58 This law also requires the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security to ensure that AIT used on passengers “complies 
with such other requirements as the Assistant Secretary determines 
necessary to address privacy considerations.”59
The TSA has issued a variety of regulations in carrying out its 
mandate.60 Most importantly to this discussion, the TSA issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)61 concerning airport 
screening of passengers with AIT.62 The proposed rule, which would 
become 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107(d), says that “[t]he screening and 
inspection described in (a) may include the use of advanced imaging 
technology. For purposes of this section, advanced imaging 
technology is defined as screening technology used to detect 
concealed anomalies without requiring physical contact with the
individual being screened.”63 The TSA issued this NPRM in response 
to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 2011, which required the TSA to 
perform notice-and-comment rulemaking on its proposal to continue 
utilizing AIT as a primary screening method.64 The comment period 
110-12 (explaining the events surrounding the Underwear Bomber’s attempted 
terrorist attack that prompted President Obama to issue this memorandum). 
58. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)(1)(C), (l)(2)(A) (2012).
59. Id. § 44901(l)(2)(B).
60. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 1500.01 et seq. (2013) (TSA Regulations).
61. A governmental agency issues an NPRM in the Federal Register in 
order to describe its proposed regulatory action and solicit public comments on it. 
Abbreviations, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/Abbrevs.jsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). As per the 
Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must include the following in an NPRM: 
“(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) 
reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the 
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). Once the 
agency has issued this notice, it must allow for a period for the public to comment 
on its NPRM. Id. § 553(c). After this comment period, the agency must consider the 
comments in issuing its final ruling, including a statement of basis and purpose for 
the rules it chooses to adopt. Id.
62. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
63. Id. at 18,296. 
64. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 8, 
11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (requiring the TSA to issue an NPRM on its use of AIT, but 
otherwise holding AIT constitutional as part of an administrative search). In this 
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concluded on June 24, 2013, and a final rule is anticipated in July
2015.65
B. Case Law and Past Challenges Regarding Constitutional Rights
Before diving any deeper into what the federal government 
should do with the TSA’s screening methods, it is first informative to 
get an overview of past challenges regarding constitutional rights in 
the airport security context and why many challenges have failed. 
First, in discussing searches of carry-on luggage in United States v. 
Edwards, the Second Circuit indicated that the history surrounding 
the Fourth Amendment’s enactment indicates that the Framers would 
have permitted reasonable methods of preventing piracy on planes.66
Further, “‘hundreds of . . . lives and millions of dollars’” are at stake 
case, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sought review of the TSA’s 
decision to use AIT instead of magnetometers at airports. Id. at 2-3. EPIC argued 
that the TSA was violating federal statutes and the Constitution and in the 
alternative, that the new rule should have been promulgated through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Id. at 3. The court held that even with the TSA’s privacy 
precautions, “an AIT scanner intrudes upon [a passenger’s] personal privacy in a 
way a magnetometer does not.” Id. at 6. Hence, the court found that this change 
from magnetometers to AIT for primary screening “substantially affects the public 
to a degree sufficient to implicate the policy interests animating notice-and-comment 
rulemaking” under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The purpose of this 
process is to allow the public to participate in the agency’s decisions and to make 
sure the agency has all necessary information to make its decision. Id. at 6. Further, 
the court found that this change was not merely interpretive since the new “policy 
substantially changes the experience of airline passengers.” Id. at 7. Therefore, the 
court remanded the rule to the TSA because it did not fall within an exception to the 
requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 8. However, the court also 
found that EPIC’s challenges to AIT based on federal statutes and the Constitution 
failed. Id. at 11.
65. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, FED. REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/26/2013-07023/passenger-
screening-using-advanced-imaging-technology (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) 
[hereinafter Passenger Screening, FED. REG.] (providing the Federal Register online, 
giving a summary of the NPRM, and detailing the action dates on the NPRM). To 
date, there have been 5,544 comments to the TSA’s NPRM on the use of AIT. 
Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2014) [hereinafter Passenger Screening, REGULATIONS.GOV]. 
66. 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974) (determining that FAA regulations 
about searching carry-ons were constitutional). Specifically, the court noted that 
“[n]othing in the history of the [Fourth] Amendment remotely suggests that the 
framers would have wished to prohibit reasonable measures to prevent the boarding 
of vessels by passengers intent on piracy.” Id.
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when a passenger takes over or destroys an airplane.67 This high-
stakes danger results in searches being reasonable if they are, in good 
faith, intended to mitigate the risk of danger and if passengers know 
about such searches beforehand.68 Therefore, although the 
government is authorized to perform security searches in airports 
because of the high risk of danger, the searches must still be 
reasonable in order to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.69 In 
determining whether the search is reasonable, the court balances the 
search’s necessity against the intrusion’s offensiveness.70
In further explaining why such searches are permissible, the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Aukai clarified that a passenger’s
consent to a search does not have any bearing on the search’s
reasonableness.71 Rather, these searches are administrative.72 Since 
they are performed under a “‘general regulatory scheme’” to further 
“‘an administrative purpose’” of preventing hijackings, weapons, or 
67. Id. at 500 (quoting United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 
1972) (Friendly, J., concurring)).
68. Id. (“‘When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large 
airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is 
conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and 
with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his 
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.’” 
(quoting Bell, 464 F.2d at 675)). 
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 497 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 
U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (stating that “the lawfulness of the search” of a house pursuant 
to a warrant does not “depend on consent” because “there is lawful authority 
independent of the will of the householder”)).
72. Id. at 960. In contrast to typical searches meant to determine whether 
someone has committed a crime, an administrative search has a different purpose. 
See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). In this context with airport searches of all passengers, the purpose is “to 
protect the public from a terrorist attack.” Id. While law enforcement officers 
typically need a warrant based on probable cause to conduct a search of a person, an 
administrative search is an exception to this requirement and also meets the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 573 (3d 
Cir. 2013). Further, although officers usually must have individualized suspicion 
that a particular person committed a crime in order to make a search reasonable, 
administrative searches of a passenger without any suspicion are allowed when 
balancing the necessity of the search for public interest against how invasive the 
search is. Id. at 573-74. In other words, an administrative search is reasonable 
precisely because it is “‘conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in 
furtherance of an administrative purpose.’” Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (quoting United 
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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explosives on planes, they are constitutionally reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment as administrative searches.73 Hence, the TSA 
may conduct a reasonable administrative screening once a passenger 
enters the secured area of an airport.74 As argued by the court in 
Aukai, allowing passengers to back out of screening after entering 
the secured area would give terrorists the opportunity to decide not to 
fly if they are subjected to further search; this would help terrorists 
slowly find vulnerabilities in security while evading detection.75
However, the Ninth Circuit also cited its earlier United States v. 
Davis decision, where it recognized that there are limits to such 
administrative searches.76 In Davis, the court articulated that 
screening passengers is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment 
as long as the “process is no more extensive nor intensive than 
necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of 
weapons or explosives, [and] that it is confined in good faith to that 
purpose.”77
Supporting this proposition, the Second Circuit concluded in 
United States v. Albarado that people have a constitutional “right to 
expect” that the search “will be as limited as possible, consistent 
with meeting the threat.”78 Specifically addressing magnetometers, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the technology’s use, which was 
warned of with signs and did not humiliate, stigmatize, bother, or 
scare passengers going through it, was reasonable in light of the 
threat that an undetected hijacker would pose to numerous 
passengers.79 Similarly, a search like a frisk may be “grossly 
invasive,” but such invasiveness is mitigated by passengers knowing 
of the search ahead of time from the signs in the airport, the lack of 
stigma from an airport pat-down, and the ability of a passenger to 
refuse the frisk and choose not to travel even if the passenger already 
set off the magnetometer.80 On this point, the Second Circuit differs 
73. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 908).
74. Id. at 961.
75. Id. at 960-61.
76. Id. at 962 (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
77. Davis, 482 F.2d at 913.
78. 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that a magnetometer involves 
an “absolutely minimal invasion of privacy” and does not involve the same 
indignities found “in fingerprinting, paring of a person’s fingernails, or a frisk” 
(citation omitted)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 807-08 (referring to frequent use of the procedure where a 
passenger setting off the machine the first time is asked “to remove all his metal 
items and return through the magnetometer” as “clearly preferred over the 
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from the Ninth Circuit in permitting passengers to back out of 
screening even after entering the secured area.81 However, the overall 
policy of both circuits in limiting the search to what is necessary is
the same, as the Second Circuit also held that the government should 
“exhaust the other efficient and available means” to find the metal 
setting off the magnetometer before resorting to a frisk.82
While the court in Albarado specifically considered 
magnetometers and frisks, some cases have challenged the 
constitutionality of AIT in particular.83 At least the D.C. Circuit has 
held AIT to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment as part of 
an administrative search,84 just as the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
allowed magnetometers and frisks.85 In response to the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States 
Department of Homeland Security, the TSA issued the NPRM
concerning the use of AIT.86 In this case, the EPIC sought review of 
the TSA’s decision to use AIT instead of magnetometers at airports, 
arguing that the TSA should have used notice-and-comment 
immediate frisk becau[s]e, while still a search, it entails far less invasion of the 
privacy or dignity of a person than to have a stranger poke and pat his body in 
various places”). 
81. Compare id., with Aukai, 497 F.3d at 961 (deciding that passengers 
cannot back out once they enter the secure area), and supra text accompanying notes 
74-75.
82. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808; see also Davis, 482 F.2d at 912-13.
83. Tobey v. Napolitano, 808 F. Supp. 2d 830, 835-36 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(finding that a man who removed some of his clothes to protest AIT did not have his 
Fourth Amendment rights violated, but that issues of fact remained on whether his 
First Amendment rights had been violated), aff’d sub nom. Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 
379 (4th Cir. 2013).
84. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 8 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that AIT in airports is an administrative search, but 
requiring the TSA to do notice-and-comment rulemaking about its use of AIT under 
the Administrative Procedure Act).
85. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806-08 (preferring the use of magnetometers as 
less invasive than frisks, but permitting each if the search is “as limited as possible” 
to still achieve the security purpose); Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (holding that searches 
of passengers at airports are reasonable if done as part of an administrative search, 
rather than due to consent). 
86. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 8 (remanding the rule to the TSA 
for notice-and-comment rulemaking); Passenger Screening Using Advanced 
Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287, 18,287 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540); see also supra note 64 (explaining further why the 
D.C. Circuit required the TSA to use notice-and-comment rulemaking on its policy 
to utilize AIT as a primary screening method in airports). 
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rulemaking to promulgate the rule.87 The court found that even with 
the TSA’s privacy precautions, AIT intrudes on privacy more than a 
magnetometer does.88 Hence, the court held that this change from 
magnetometers to AIT for primary screening substantially “affects 
the public to a degree sufficient to implicate the policy interests 
animating notice-and-comment rulemaking” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.89 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit 
remanded the rule to the TSA for notice-and-comment rulemaking,90
and the TSA issued its NPRM on AIT.91 The TSA has received 
numerous comments on its NPRM;92 after the TSA issues its final 
rule, other circuits may also be asked to review constitutionality of 
AIT.93
III. ISSUES IN CHOOSING APPROPRIATE SCREENING METHODS
In finding a solution to this ongoing debate over privacy and 
security in airports, it is helpful to look back on what the United 
States and other countries have done in the past, what has worked, 
and what has failed.94 Further, in order to accommodate privacy, the 
TSA needs to measure and compare the increases in invasion of 
87. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 2-3. For an explanation of how the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process works, see supra note 61.
88. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 6 (“[A]n AIT scanner intrudes upon 
[a passenger’s] personal privacy in a way a magnetometer does not.”).
89. Id. (explaining that the purpose of the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process is to allow the public to participate in the TSA’s decisions and more fully 
inform the agency before it makes decisions). Further, the court found that was not 
just an interpretive change because the new “policy substantially changes the 
experience of airline passengers.” Id. at 7. 
90. Id. at 8.
91. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,287.
92. To date, there have been 5,544 comments to the TSA’s NPRM on the 
use of AIT. See Passenger Screening, REGULATIONS.GOV, supra note 65. While 
asking the TSA to follow Israel’s example with profiling instead of utilizing AIT, 
one commenter said that although he has “been treated fairly” by the TSA, he 
“object[s] to the fact that the program [using AIT] bypassed this public commentary 
in the beginning.” Anonymous, Comment to Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging 
Technology (Federal Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-0466. 
93. A final rule is anticipated in July 2015. See Passenger Screening, FED.
REG., supra note 65.
94. See infra Sections III.A-B. 
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privacy and increases in security from new and existing measures.95
While some security measures may be constitutional,96 sound public 
policy suggests that Congress ought to take a more active role in 
protecting its citizens from gross invasions of privacy.97
A. The Effectiveness and Invasiveness of Current Security Methods
The first step in determining what measures the TSA should 
use is looking further into the effectiveness and invasiveness of the 
security measures that the TSA does use. The TSA currently utilizes 
millimeter-wave AIT equipped with ATR as a primary method of 
screening passengers.98 Both as a secondary form of screening and 
for passengers opting out of body scans, the TSA conducts full-body 
pat-downs.99 These passenger-screening methods are part of the 
TSA’s “risk-based, layered security approach.”100 In order to 
accommodate concerns about child pornography with AIT, the 
TSA’s procedure currently allows children to go through 
magnetometers, also known as WTMDs, unless the adult traveling 
with the child opts otherwise.101 Overall, the TSA’s goal is to use a 
“risk-based, layered security approach” with visible checkpoints at 
airports, intelligence gathering on terrorist threats, the Secure Flight 
program,102 examinations of passenger documentation and 
identification, systems to detect explosives, and random security 
tests.103
1. How Effective Are Current Security Methods?
In support of its use of AIT in particular, the TSA claims that 
AIT is the most effective method currently available for discovering 
potentially threatening metal and non-metal objects concealed under 
95. See infra Sections III.A-B.
96. See supra Section II.B. 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 206, 213.
98. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,294 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 18,291.
101. Id. at 18,297. 
102. Under its Secure Flight program, the TSA “check[s] passenger 
manifests against records from the Government known or suspected terrorist watch 
lists.” Id. at 18,291. 
103. Id. at 18,291-92 (explaining the TSA’s layers of security and the need 
for experienced personnel as well as effective technology).
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a passenger’s clothing without requiring a TSA officer to touch the 
passenger physically.104 Illustrating the benefits of AIT, the TSA 
cited its experience using the technology to detect concealed 
weapons, even if they were made out of non-metallic materials.105
However, one critic, Stancombe, still questions the effectiveness of 
AIT, noting that experts are divided over AIT’s effectiveness and are 
worried that terrorists will still be able to conceal weapons from AIT 
scanners, concluding that “‘normal anatomy . . . make[s] a dangerous 
amount of plastic explosives with tapered edges difficult if not 
impossible to detect.’”106
Additionally, in challenging the effectiveness of the TSA’s
search methods, another scholar, Olsen, argues that even the TSA’s
current security measures may not have detected the explosives 
carried by the “Shoe Bomber,” Richard Reid, because the explosives 
were concealed in his shoe.107 In 2001, Reid was on a flight from 
Paris to Miami when the passengers and flight crew found him trying 
to detonate the explosives on board.108 Since the explosive materials 
were concealed in his shoe’s heel when he went through the security 
checkpoint, the TSA could not have detected them with either a full-
body pat-down, which would not include patting down of shoes, or 
with AIT, which cannot “penetrate solid materials.”109
Further, Olsen points out that in 2009, a whole body imaging 
scanner in Europe did not detect the explosives concealed by the 
“Underwear Bomber,” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who then 
continued on his journey from Amsterdam, Netherlands to Detroit, 
Michigan.110 Fortunately, the Underwear Bomber was unable to 
104. Id. at 18,292.
105. Id. at 18,297. 
106. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 200-01 (quoting Leon Kaufman & Joseph 
W. Carlson, An Evaluation of Airport X-ray Backscatter Units Based on Image 
Characteristics, 4 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 73, 73 (2011)). 
107. Olsen, supra note 12, at 14.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. However, the TSA reports that the Underwear Bomber never 
actually passed through WBI at any of the airports though which he travelled. Mark 
Strassmann, Ex-TSA Chief: Full-Body Scanners Would Have Caught New 
Underwear Bomb, CBS NEWS (May 9, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/ex-tsa-chief-full-body-scanners-would-have-caught-new-underwear-bomb/. 
Although there are conflicting reports on whether the Underwear Bomber went 
through some form of body imaging technology, there is still debate over whether 
AIT effectively detects such concealed explosives. See supra text accompanying 
notes 104-09 (debating the effectiveness of AIT). Therefore, it is unclear whether 
AIT would have detected the Underwear Bomber’s explosives and prevented him 
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detonate his explosive chemicals, and the passengers and flight crew 
were able to detain him.111 Although the TSA used this as an 
example of the need for AIT and full-body pat-downs, in reality, the 
WBI in place did not detect the Underwear Bomber’s concealed 
chemicals, allowing him to board the plane with them.112
Moreover, the TSA has not released the results of its testing of 
AIT at airports, citing security reasons for not releasing them.113 Due 
to the security concerns involved in revealing weaknesses of current 
methods, it may be difficult to accurately assess the increased safety 
from AIT apart from trusting the TSA’s assessment of the situation 
or relying on miscellaneous stories from whistleblowers and the 
media.114 Perhaps people submitting comments to the TSA’s NPRM
on its use of AIT further addressed the TSA’s resistance to disclosing 
AIT test results.115 In that case, the TSA should more specifically 
respond to those comments in issuing its final ruling, considering the 
actual effectiveness of AIT and full-body pat-downs as opposed to 
prior methods.116
from boarding the plane. Further, even assuming that AIT is effective, the use of 
AIT is still a cause for concern because AIT is highly intrusive on individual 
privacy. See infra Subsection III.A.2 (detailing the invasiveness of AIT).
111. Olsen, supra note 12, at 14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 19; see also Grant Stinchfield, TSA Source: Armed Agent Slips 
Past DFW Body Scanner, NBCDFW (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:28 PM), 
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/TSA-Agent-Slips-Through-DFW-Body-
Scanner-With-a-Gun-116497568.html (reporting on a test of AIT in the Dallas/Fort 
Worth International Airport where an undercover TSA officer made it through 
security with a concealed handgun and noting that the TSA cited security reasons for 
not publicizing its covert test results).
114. Olsen, supra note 12, at 19 (noting the existence of “anecdotal reports 
that the TSA regularly fails to detect weapons and explosives in its own security 
tests, although the actual test results remain classified”); Stinchfield, supra note 113.
While the TSA is reluctant to release the weaknesses in its security methods, it could 
still provide information about how much more secure its new methods are in 
practice. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 14; Stinchfield, supra note 113. Courts could 
then use this information in conducting their reasonableness test, balancing the 
increased security against the invasiveness of the TSA’s methods. See United States 
v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (explaining that courts balance the 
need for the search against its intrusiveness to determine whether it is reasonable). 
115. See Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,287 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
116. See supra note 61 (explaining that under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), an agency 
must consider the comments received from the public on its NPRM in issuing its 
final rule). 
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2. How Invasive Are Current Security Methods?
Even assuming that AIT and full-body pat-downs are effective, 
when balanced against their invasiveness, the increased security 
benefits of these methods must outweigh their intrusion on privacy if 
the security methods are to be considered reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.117 The TSA argues that while AIT can generate 
images of people’s bodies, two-thirds of Americans support its 
use.118 With this statistic and Americans choosing to continue flying, 
some have argued that Americans do not see AIT as all that 
intrusive.119 While the results of the poll could be indicative of the 
level of intrusion perceived by Americans, it could also partially be 
the result of Americans informally or subconsciously performing the 
balancing test themselves in determining whether or not they think
that the security benefits of AIT outweigh the intrusions into 
privacy.120 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the majority of 
Americans consent to the TSA’s security measures in deciding to fly, 
any argument referring to the “consent” of Americans to the use of 
AIT or full-body pat-downs is largely irrelevant, since courts have 
117. See supra text accompanying note 70.
118. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 201 (citing a poll where two-thirds of 
respondents supported AIT use, but over half of respondents said pat-downs go too 
far). For full poll results and a discussion of the poll, see Ashley Halsey III & Derek 
Kravitz, Protests of TSA Airport Pat-Downs, Body Scanners Don’t Delay 
Thanksgiving Travel, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2010, 12:33 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112406
989.html?sid=ST2010113005385; Washington Post Poll, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_11222010.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2014).
119. See Halsey & Kravitz, supra note 118.
120. See id. However, not all Americans who choose to fly believe that the 
enhanced security measures are justified. For instance, in commenting on the TSA’s 
NPRM on AIT, Nelson asked the TSA to “roll back airport security to pre-9/11 
levels and eliminate all enhanced imaging technology from screening checkpoints. 
With the enhancements to airliners’ cockpit doors, an actual hijacking is no longer 
feasible. I am willing to accept some risk in order to maintain my dignity and 
personal liberties.” P. Nelson, Comment to Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging 
Technology (Federal Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-3028. Further, 
Mark Scheid commented, “As a regular traveler, [AIT devices] do not make me feel 
safer, they make me feel violated. . . . Because of this, I have opted out of this device 
dozens of times . . . .” Mark Scheid, Comment to Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced 
Imaging Technology (Federal Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (June 5, 
2013), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-3033. 
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already held that airport screenings of passengers are constitutional 
pursuant to an administrative search rather than due to consent.121
Thus, pointing out that many Americans think that the use of AIT is 
justified, and would therefore consent to its use, does not 
automatically make it un-invasive or constitutional pursuant to the 
administrative search’s reasonableness requirement.122
Additionally, the fact that Americans still choose to fly does 
not necessarily mean that they find the TSA’s security measures 
unintrusive.123 Rather, they may feel like the father traveling with his 
child before Thanksgiving Day, who said, “The choice is to have 
[my daughter] microwaved or felt up, but we gotta get to Grandma’s, 
so we’ll do it.”124 Moreover, Americans may feel strongly opposed to
and highly violated by both AIT and full-body pat-downs, but they 
may share former Miss USA Susie Castillo’s view of the situation.125
After feeling grossly violated by the TSA in a full-body pat-down, 
Castillo blogged, “My work requires me to travel often, and I don’t
want to be degraded and driven to tears . . . everytime I fly. If I 
could, I would boycott airline travel altogether, but that would mean 
that I, and MANY others, wouldn’t work.”126 This is partly because 
flying for work, to see family, or to go on a vacation is far more time 
efficient, particularly over long distances, than traveling by car, bus, 
ship, or train.127 Therefore, although Americans continue to fly, they 
may still see the security methods in place as highly invasive.128
121. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). 
122. See id. For instance, although the D.C. Circuit did not find AIT 
unconstitutional in ordering the TSA to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, it did 
indicate that “it is clear that by producing an image of the unclothed passenger, an 
AIT scanner intrudes upon . . . personal privacy in a way a magnetometer does not.” 
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
123. On average, nearly 1.8 million people flew within the United States 
each day in 2013, totaling around 646 million passengers per year. Research & 
Innovative Tech. Admin., Passengers: All Carriers - Airports, BUREAU TRANSP.
STAT., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
This is up slightly from 2012, when approximately 642 million passengers flew 
within the United States. Id. In contrast, in 2002, only about 552 million people flew 
domestically in the United States. Id.
124. Halsey & Kravitz, supra note 118 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(explaining one passenger’s view of AIT and full-body pat-downs). 
125. Former Miss USA Feels “Violated” by TSA Pat-Down, supra note 3.
126. Castillo, supra note 1.
127. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974). 
128. See Halsey & Kravitz, supra note 118.
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Further, in the same poll where two-thirds of Americans 
responding said that AIT was justified, half of the respondents also 
indicated that they believed full-body pat-downs went too far.129 The 
TSA currently uses full-body pat-downs as a secondary form of 
screening, which the courts have approved in the past when all other 
methods have been exhausted.130 However, the TSA also uses full-
body pat-downs as a primary screening method for people opting out 
of AIT.131 The TSA in part justifies its use of AIT by explaining that 
people are not forced to use it, can choose a pat-down instead, and 
rarely choose to opt out.132 However, if people see a full-body pat-
down as more intrusive than a body scan, it is no wonder that few 
passengers opt out of AIT in favor of a pat-down.133 Again, while
airport screenings do not rely on consent for their constitutionality,134
the TSA is misguided if it justifies the use of AIT by claiming that 
Americans have approved of AIT.135 In particular, the TSA is ill 
advised when it attempts to demonstrate this approval by the fact that 
most passengers do not opt out of AIT when passengers are given an 
alternative that they see as even more invasive, such as a full-body 
pat-down.136
129. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 201.
130. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808.
131. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,294 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). 
132. Id. at 18,289, 18,294. 
133. See Stancombe, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing the poll where many 
respondents saw full-body pat-downs as going too far while viewing AIT as 
justified); see also The TSA and Full-Body Scanners. Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid.,
EVERYWHEREIST (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.everywhereist.com/the-tsa-and-full-
body-scanners-be-afraid-be-very-afraid/ (“And that’s another thing—the TSA is 
trying to say that we have a choice, which just isn’t true. If you decide that you don’t 
want to be exposed to radiation and humiliation [from AIT], you can opt for a 
physical pat-down search (which just exposes you to the latter). The TSA claims that 
the machines must be great, because 79% of people chose them over a physical pat-
down. But the choice is simply a lesser of two evils, and the TSA has orchestrated it 
to be so. The physical pat-down is incredibly intrusive—a traveler will have their 
hair, breasts, genitalia, and buttocks patted down, and agents can use the front of 
their hands (they previously had to use the backs). It takes more time, and you’ll be 
singled out and essentially treated like a criminal. Given the choice between being 
molested or being exposed to a tiny bit of ‘harmless’ radiation, it seems the choice is 
clear for a lot of travelers.”).
134. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). 
135. See Stancombe, supra note 9, at 201.
136. See id.
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B. The Effectiveness and Invasiveness of Alternate Security 
Methods
In order to figure out whether the TSA currently uses 
appropriate security methods, it is also important to look at the 
context of what other countries do137 and what the United States has 
done in the past.138 Additionally, just as with the TSA’s current 
methods, it is vital to examine how effective or invasive each 
alternative security method is in practice.139 Further, it is imperative 
to delve into whether the TSA’s changes have actually increased 
security.140
1. What Do Other Countries Do and How Effective and 
Invasive Is It?
In order to evaluate the wisdom of the United States’ chosen 
security measures, the TSA should also consider what other 
countries have done to enhance security and how invasive those 
methods are. For instance, Italy chose not to employ AIT units in its 
airport security because it found the scanners to be ineffective,141 and 
the United Kingdom delayed its use of AIT because of concerns 
likening the technology to child pornography when used on 
children.142 While this makes Italy and the United Kingdom less 
invasive of privacy than the United States, the TSA may argue that 
according to its congressional mandate, it needs to continue 
developing and implementing measures like AIT to make the United 
137. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
138. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
139. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2. 
140. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
141. Olsen, supra note 12, at 23 (noting that Italy abandoned whole body 
imaging machines “after a brief testing period”). Italy tested AIT in several 
international airports and determined that the scanners were “inaccurate and 
inconvenient.” Tests in Italy Raise New Questions About Airport Body Scanners,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER (Sept. 17, 2010), http://epic.org/2010/09/tests-
in-italy-raise-new-quest.html. Further, the European Commission recommended less 
invasive security methods, stating that AIT raised fundamental concerns about 
people’s rights and health. Id.
142. The TSA and Full-Body Scanners. Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid., supra
note 133.
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States’ airports more secure, even if such measures infringe on 
privacy.143
In stark contrast to the TSA’s use of AIT and full-body pat-
downs, Israel’s El Al airline does not use body scanners or pat-
downs at all.144 Instead, El Al uses intelligence gathering, 
observations, and questioning of passengers individually when they 
check in.145 While this method is extremely different than the TSA’s
methods, it has proven highly effective, as “El Al also has not had a 
single tragedy in forty years.”146 Further, this form of security 
through questioning, while perhaps causing passengers to be 
nervous, does not at all intrude on a person’s privacy by taking a 
nude image of her or feeling her body up and down.147 However, 
Israel’s method would be a cumbersome process to set up in the 
United States and would be extremely difficult to implement due to
the size differential between Israel and the United States and the 
greater level of flight traffic in the United States.148
143. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49 (explaining how the TSA was 
created after 9/11 and was given its congressional mandates to increase security at 
airports).
144. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 211-15; see also Olsen, supra note 12, at 
23 (pointing out that “even though Israel may be the number-one terrorist target in 
the world, it does not use body scanners for passenger screening,” but uses 
intelligence gathering, observations, and questioning).
145. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 211-15; see also Olsen, supra note 12, at 
23.
146. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 212. 
147. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 23 (noting that Israel does not use body 
scanners or pat-downs).
148. See Carla Garrison, Israel: A Brief History of the Fight over a Land the 
Size of New Jersey, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/truth-be-told/2011/apr/15/
israel-brief-history-fight-over-land-size-new-jers/ (explaining that Israel is only 
7,850 square miles, approximately the same size as New Jersey); see also Research 
& Innovative Tech. Admin., T-100 International Market (All Carriers): Sum: On-
Flight Market Passengers Enplaned by OriginCountry for 2012, BUREAU TRANSP.
STAT., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Oneway.asp?Display_Flag=0&Percent_Flag=0 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (noting that in 2012, only 698,426 passengers originated 
from flights in Israel, while 86,463,518 passengers originated from flights in the 
United States). Since the United States is so much larger than Israel and has many 
more airline passengers, a security system where each passenger is interviewed prior 
to flying would require substantially more TSA officers to carry out the interviews 
and more intensive training of those officers than currently needed in the United 
States.
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More like the policy in the United States, the Netherlands also 
uses AIT.149 After the Underwear Bomber tried to set off an 
improvised explosive device on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, 
the Netherlands changed from its policy of allowing passengers to 
voluntarily go through a body scanner to a policy requiring that all 
passengers traveling from Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport to the 
United States go through a body scanner.150 While the Netherlands 
uses AIT much like the TSA does, the Netherlands was ahead of the 
TSA in mitigating the invasiveness of AIT by using technology that 
only outlines the area where an object may be concealed “on a
generic mannequin figure instead of on the actual image of the 
passenger’s body.”151 Since the Seattle Times reported on this in 
2010, the TSA has also placed ATR on all AIT units at airports, thus 
bringing the United States on par with the Netherlands in regard to 
alleviating the invasiveness of body scanners.152
2. What Has the United States Done in the Past, and Have 
Changes Really Increased Security?
Like other countries, the United States has used a variety of 
security methods at airports in the past, like magnetometers, metal 
detector wands, light frisks, enhanced full-body pat-downs, and 
various forms of WBI or AIT.153 Magnetometers, or WTMDs, were 
originally used to combat hijacking by preventing passengers from 
carrying metal weapons onboard airplanes.154 When Congress 
directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require 
149. Daniel Michaels, Dutch to Use Body Scanners: New Technology Will 
Screen U.S.-Bound Passengers Amid Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2009, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB126217311115510051.
150. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 110-12 (explaining how the 
Underwear Bomber brought explosives onto an airplane even though he passed 
through a whole body imaging scanner in Europe). 
151. Tony Pugh, U.S. Body-Scan Technology Used by Dutch Is Better than 
Ours, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010, 7:10 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/
nationworld/2013470008_airportfix19.html. 
152. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,294 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). 
Further, in 2012, Congress passed a statute requiring the TSA to equip all AIT units 
with ATR. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)(1)(C), (l)(2)(A) (2012).
153. See supra Part I (discussing these security measures and how they 
work); see also Stancombe, supra note 9, at 184-89 (explaining current pre-flight 
screening procedures in airports, AIT, ATR, and pat-downs). 
154. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,290. 
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passenger screening for weapons in 1974, Congress also instructed 
the FAA to develop new procedures and devices to increase airplane 
security.155
Since 9/11, Congress created the TSA to further focus on 
regulating airport security.156 The TSA continued the FAA’s research 
to develop ways to combat the new threats from non-metallic 
explosives and weapons, which magnetometers were unable to 
detect.157 For instance, after two female passengers in Russia 
successfully hid explosives in their torsos, the TSA revised its pat-
down procedures to allow for more thorough physical searches.158
Additionally, the TSA believes that its AIT would have been able to 
detect the non-metallic explosives concealed by the Underwear 
Bomber, as well as other similar explosives.159 As the TSA explained 
that “non-metallic explosives are now one of the foremost known 
threats to passenger aircraft,” the TSA considers AIT a vital part of 
its “risk-based, layered security approach” to protecting 
Americans.160 Hence, although some disagree with the TSA on the 
155. Id.; Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 316, 
88 Stat. 409, 415-17.
156. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,291; see also supra text accompanying notes 46-50 (discussing the TSA’s 
creation and responsibilities). 
157. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,291. 
158. Id. Additionally, in response to the Shoe Bomber, the TSA implemented 
procedures requiring passengers to remove their shoes for scanning. Id.; see also
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., Need for Removal of Shoes at Checkpoint, 
(Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/news/2013/01/07/need-
removal-shoes-checkpoint (explaining why passengers must remove their shoes for 
additional screening). Further, the TSA limited the quantity of liquids that 
passengers can bring on flights and increased liquid screening after a terrorist in the 
United Kingdom brought liquid explosives on board a plane. Passenger Screening 
Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. at 18,291. 
159. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,291. 
160. Id.
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effectiveness of AIT,161 the TSA believes that AIT and full-body pat-
downs have increased security over previous methods.162
C. Public Policy and Arguments Supporting Less Invasive Security 
Methods
Depending on where the debate over the effectiveness of AIT 
and full-body pat-downs comes out, the high level of intrusion into 
privacy by these methods could outweigh their safety benefits and 
cause them to be unconstitutional because they fail the 
reasonableness test for an administrative search.163 On the other 
hand, if these methods are highly effective, their use can be justified, 
as the D.C. Circuit164 and at least one scholar found them to be.165
However, simply because a method is justified under a balancing test 
that courts have used in the past does not necessitate the conclusion 
that the sacrifice of privacy is worth the perhaps minimal increases in 
security.166 Furthermore, just because courts have found particular 
security measures to be constitutional does not necessarily mean that 
161. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 198-201 (discussing tests of AIT and 
noting that “there is still debate as to whether or not these AIT units are even 
effective”); Olsen, supra note 12, at 14 (pointing out that explosives carried by the 
Shoe Bomber may not have been detected by whole body imaging or full-body pat-
downs and that AIT in Europe did not detect the Underwear Bomber’s explosives). 
For a more detailed discussion on the effectiveness of the TSA’s current methods, 
particularly full-body pat-downs and AIT, see supra Subsection III.A.1. 
162. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,291-92. While some may support an intelligence gathering approach, 
which could decrease the need for highly invasive physical security methods, one 
scholar argues that physical-based approaches are more secure than intelligence-
based approaches are. See generally Ian David Fiske, Note, Failing to Secure the 
Skies: Why American Has Struggled to Protect Itself and How It Can Change, 15 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 173 (2010). 
163. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
164. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
165. See LeVine, supra note 35, at 188 (concluding that AIT is probably 
constitutional).
166. The Ninth Circuit warned that airport security checks require “the 
greatest vigilance” by courts because “they are capable of great abuse” and 
recognized that “[l]iberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by 
government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who 
seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha 
can be as deadly as the shark.” United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 
1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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Congress should permit the TSA to use them with unbridled 
discretion.167
If Congress is not willing to correct potential abuse in airports, 
what will stop agencies like the TSA from invading privacy in other 
ways or with other means of transportation?168 What are the 
implications beyond planes to trains and automobiles?169 While some 
currently argue that passengers who oppose AIT and full-body pat-
downs at airports can travel by other means, is it valid to simply state 
that objecting passengers can take the train?170 While a train could be 
a viable alternative for people in certain regions of the country or for 
shorter trips, having to travel by train, bus, or automobile across the 
country for business meetings every week or to visit family for the 
holidays could cause great hardships on some Americans or make it 
impossible to do their jobs.171 Further, although there may be viable 
travel alternatives for some Americans who object to AIT and full-
body pat-downs, this argument would be damaged in the future if the 
TSA also established security checkpoints in other methods of 
transportation, further reducing the available alternatives.172
Therefore, Congress should seriously consider the amount of leeway 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 204, 206, 213 (explaining the 
responses of a state and a scholar asking Congress to utilize greater oversight and set 
guidelines for the TSA). 
168. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 13 (explaining that the TSA performed pat-
downs of passengers on disembarking trains at an Amtrak station in Georgia and 
wondering where the TSA’s authority to conduct such searches stops). 
169. Id. 
170. Halsey & Kravitz, supra note 118 (quoting a passenger who was fine 
with the body scanners and who declared, “‘I believe we need to do the appropriate 
thing to keep the skies safe. If people have severe objections, they should take the 
train’”); see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
171. See Castillo, supra note 1 (explaining that if former Miss USA Susie 
Castillo chose not to fly, she would no longer be able to do her job). Compare
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974) (“While it may be 
argued there are often other forms of transportation available, it would work a 
considerable hardship on many air travelers to be forced to utilize an alternate form 
of transportation, assuming one exists at all.”), with United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 
893, 913 n.59 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The airport search program is not an absolute bar to 
travel. Other means of transportation are available. Moreover, for the vast majority 
such a search entails at most a slight delay; it does not bar their intended flight.”). 
172. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 13 (“Travelers who have refused to fly in 
order to avoid TSA searches could also be in for a rude awakening, because the TSA 
may expand its search checkpoints to other modes of transportation as well.”).
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that it gives to the TSA because the TSA can so deeply invade the 
privacy of Americans on a daily basis.173
D. Counterarguments Supporting More Invasive Security Methods
While there may be valid reasons for protecting privacy rights 
of Americans, the TSA has strong arguments in support of its use of 
more invasive methods like AIT and full-body pat-downs. Under the 
Department of Homeland Security, the TSA’s mission is “to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States and to reduce the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.”174 As such, the TSA 
believes that AIT, a more invasive security method than the 
previously used magnetometers,175 is essential in carrying out its 
mission.176 Supporting this proposition, the TSA argued in its NPRM
that current threats to airport security involve non-metallic 
explosives and weapons, which AIT provides the best method of 
discovering without physically touching passengers.177
As per its mandate to conduct a cost–benefit analysis, 
comparing the cost of the new technology to the number of lives 
saved,178 the TSA calculated the costs of implementing AIT from 
2008 to 2011 at $841.2 million and the costs of maintaining AIT in 
use from 2012 to 2015 at $1.5 billion.179 While the TSA did not 
provide a calculation of the estimated lives saved or their value, in 
adopting AIT the TSA is indicating that it believes that the value of 
increased security outweighs the monetary cost of AIT.180 Similarly, 
173. For a discussion on how Congress should limit the TSA’s discretion and 
provide greater guidance to and oversight of the TSA, see infra Part V.
174. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,289 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540); 
see also 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2006 & Supp. 2009); supra text accompanying notes 47-
53 (laying out some of the provisions from 49 U.S.C. § 114 and explaining what the 
TSA was created to do). 
175. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
176. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,289. 
177. Id. at 18,289-90. 
178. 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3); see also supra text accompanying notes 51-52
(laying out the details of this statute and what the TSA is required to consider in this 
cost–benefit analysis). 
179. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,289-90; see also supra note 53 (discussing the TSA’s cost–benefit 
analysis in its NPRM). 
180. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3). 
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implementing AIT and full-body pat-downs also means that the TSA 
believes it has satisfied the balancing test for an administrative 
search, which requires the invasiveness of these measures to be 
outweighed by the corresponding increase in security.181
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Electronic 
Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of 
Homeland Security agreed with the TSA that the balancing test 
supports the need for AIT, which the court considered more effective 
than WTMDs.182
While some may still argue that the TSA is on a dangerous 
road,183 others support the TSA’s direction and believe that these 
more invasive methods are worth the added security benefits that 
come along with them.184 One scholar has argued that intelligence-
based security systems in the United States have historically failed.185
For example, the United Kingdom and other sources informed the 
United States that the Underwear Bomber had taken a vow of jihad 
against the United States.186 Even though the United States added his 
name to the terrorist suspect list, the government did not place him 
on the watch list or revoke his American visa.187 If the government 
had done so, he probably would not have been able to board a plane 
in Europe bound for the United States, during which flight the 
passengers and crew stopped him from setting off explosives.188 As a 
result, the United States has shifted back to physical-based security 
methods, such as AIT and full-body pat-downs, in order to enhance 
security.189
181. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974).
182. 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
183. See supra Section III.C (discussing arguments in support of less 
invasive security measures). 
184. See Fiske, supra note 162, at 175 (arguing that physical security 
systems in airports are more effective than intelligence-based systems); see also
LeVine, supra note 35, at 188 (concluding that AIT is probably constitutional).
185. See Fiske, supra note 162, at 175 (arguing that the most effective airport 
security “system is one based on physical security, not intelligence measures”). 
186. Id. at 174-75.
187. Id. at 175. However, another scholar argues that the physical security 
methods the TSA currently uses with full-body pat-downs and AIT would not have 
detected the explosives the Underwear Bomber had concealed. See Olsen, supra
note 12, at 14. 
188. See Fiske, supra note 162, at 175. 
189. See id. at 196 (noting that the United States follows a “yo-yo effect” 
pattern in its airport security, “moving slowly from a strong physical security 
approach after an attack to an intelligence-based approach, then quickly snapping 
back to more physical measures after the next attack”). 
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Therefore, while the invasiveness of AIT and full body pat-
downs is fairly clear,190 the debate over the effectiveness of AIT 
continues.191 Although courts have generally accepted the TSA’s use 
of these methods by determining that the increased security benefits 
outweigh the losses to privacy,192 the debate does not have to end 
there. Rather, Congress could step in and alter this formula by
providing further guidance to the TSA or limiting its power to 
intrude on passengers’ rights and privacy.193 Often with this hope in 
mind, states and scholars have devised various strategies to strike 
what they believe is a more proper balance.194
IV. STATES AND SCHOLARS HAVE RESPONDED, BUT SOMETHING IS
MISSING
While within this debate over the effectiveness and 
invasiveness of different security measures195 some people have 
challenged the TSA’s actions in court,196 states have focused their 
efforts on legislative reform,197 and scholars have proposed a variety 
of solutions to the constitutional issues at stake.198 However, the 
effect of such efforts and proposals is still unclear. While it seems 
that Americans have lost many battles to the TSA on the 
constitutionality front in court,199 they may yet win the war in 
protecting their privacy if Congress specifically limits the TSA’s
power to invade individual privacy. Whereas some scholars and 
190. See supra Subsection III.A.2 (providing an overview of the 
invasiveness of AIT and full body pat-downs). 
191. See supra Subsections III.A.1, III.B.2 (exploring the arguments and 
counter-arguments on AIT’s effectiveness).
192. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the use of AIT is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment as an administrative search); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 
807-08 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that a frisk can be reasonable even though it is 
highly invasive because passengers know about it ahead of time and officers use less 
intrusive means of searching passengers before resorting to a frisk). 
193. See infra Part V (proposing various reforms for Congress to initiate that 
would provide greater protections for privacy). 
194. See discussion infra Sections IV.A-B (explaining what several states 
and scholars have proposed to fix this dilemma).
195. See supra Part III. 
196. See supra Section II.B. 
197. See infra Section IV.A. 
198. See infra Section IV.B. 
199. See supra Section II.B (discussing court cases where people challenged 
the constitutionality of various airport security methods). 
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states have called in general for greater congressional oversight of 
the TSA,200 specific congressional action to limit the TSA’s invasion 
of privacy is needed.201
A. State Responses
Along with citizens challenging the constitutionality of various 
TSA measures,202 some states have reacted negatively to the TSA’s
move toward more invasive security measures and have sought 
various kinds of administrative and legislative relief.203 For instance, 
in a press conference, New Jersey Assembly members petitioned the 
TSA to rethink its screening processes because as State Senator 
Doherty said, Americans should not be forced “‘to surrender their 
civil liberties or basic human dignity at a TSA checkpoint,’” even for 
the sake of security.204 Similarly, Alaska’s House and Senate directly 
called for congressional action after an Alaska state representative 
had to take a four-day trip, including traveling by boat, to return
home when she refused to be patted down at an airport.205 After this 
incident, Alaska’s House and Senate “passed resolutions calling on 
Congress to reconsider [the TSA’s] use of full-body pat-downs, and 
to exercise greater oversight over the TSA.”206 Taking this a step 
further and bypassing the United States Congress, New Hampshire 
even proposed legislation “that would make nude body scans and 
random pat-down searches a crime in that state, even if conducted by 
the TSA.”207 While the actual impact of these state reactions is 
unclear, Congress should sincerely consider such reactions in 
determining how much leeway to give to the TSA in the future in 
areas that so deeply impact the privacy and dignity of Americans.
200. See Solomon, supra note 35, at 646 (supporting the use of AIT, but 
urging Congress to set guidelines for the TSA and require assurances that the TSA 
will respect passenger privacy); Olsen, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining that Alaska’s 
House and Senate called for Congress to provide more oversight for the TSA and to 
review the TSA’s policy with full-body pat-downs). 
201. See infra Section IV.C. 
202. See supra Section II.B.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 204-05.
204. NJ Lawmakers Want to Stop TSA Full Body Scans, NJTODAY.NET (Nov. 
15, 2010), http://njtoday.net/2010/11/15/nj-lawmakers-want-to-stop-tsa-full-body-
scans/ (quoting New Jersey Senator Michael J. Doherty).
205. Olsen, supra note 12, at 8.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 9.
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B. What Scholars Have Argued
Scholars have also used a variety of approaches to question the 
constitutionality of the TSA’s increasingly invasive security 
measures.208 One scholar has challenged the constitutionality of 
airport screening methods as it relates to consent to search.209
However, courts have since clarified that airport screening is not 
based on consent, but based on a statutory right to perform an 
administrative search subjected to a reasonableness analysis.210
Another scholar has argued that body scans could be considered 
constitutional if used as a secondary form of screening rather than as 
a primary search method for all passengers.211 While the TSA’s new 
policy with AIT would permit the use of AIT in primary screening, 
the utilization of ATR mitigates the invasiveness of AIT to some 
extent.212
Further, another scholar even supports the use of AIT overall 
while calling for Congress to set guidelines for the TSA and to 
obtain assurances from the TSA that it will respect passenger 
privacy.213 Another critic warns that the TSA should balance the 
safety provided by new technologies against the rights to privacy and 
protection from unreasonable searches.214 She argues that “in defense 
of American freedom,” Americans should not “destroy the very 
freedom that [they] so ardently fight to protect.”215 In examining the 
208. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
209. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Validity of Airport 
Security Measures, 125 A.L.R. 5th 281 (2005) (considering Fourth Amendment 
issues and consent searches).
210. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007).
211. See generally Tobias W. Mock, Comment, The TSA’s New X-Ray 
Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic 
Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213 (2009) (explaining the 
background of security technology in airports and concluding that body scans should 
be used for secondary searches instead of pat-downs).
212. Id. at 217-20; Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging 
Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287, 18,293-94 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
213. See generally Solomon, supra note 35 (discussing the balancing of the 
degree of intrusion, public necessity, and efficacy).
214. See Stancombe, supra note 9, at 210 (arguing that it is unconstitutional 
to use AIT—where “passengers are virtually strip-searched”—as primary screening, 
but noting that it may not be unconstitutional if automated target recognition 
software is used).
215. Id. at 215. Similarly, Sean M., in his comment to the TSA’s NPRM, 
argued that these invasive searches should be stopped because “[w]e gain so little 
with these additional security screenings, but collectively sacrifice so much civil 
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balancing test that courts use, one scholar notes that it is unclear 
whether AIT actually improves security, particularly as terrorists 
consistently adapt to security measures.216 With this in mind, an 
additional scholar has asserted that trusted traveler programs could 
be used as a risk-based approach to screening while addressing the 
needs of individual travelers.217
C. Something Is Missing
While scholars have taken a variety of approaches to resolving 
questions on the constitutionality of TSA measures,218 none have 
suggested a satisfactory solution to protecting privacy. Indeed, one 
glaringly missing solution is for Congress to explicitly limit the 
TSA’s authority.219 Although some have suggested that Congress 
should set guidelines for TSA security methods so that privacy will 
be respected,220 any such guidelines could still provide the TSA with 
too much discretion, as they are extremely vague and would be 
liberty. . . . [T]he only effective fight against terrorism is to refuse to be terrorized. 
The appropriate response is proportional to the actual frequency of these crimes, not 
in the perceived/sensational risk.” Sean M., Comment to Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) Other: NPRM—Passenger Screening Using Advanced 
Imaging Technology Signed Version, REGULATIONS.GOV (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-3046. But see D. 
Henson, Comment to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Proposed Rule: 
NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology (Federal 
Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-3361 (“The price 
of freedom is security. The price of security is privacy.”). 
216. Stancombe, supra note 9, at 200-01; see also supra text accompanying 
note 70 (explaining that in determining whether a search is reasonable, the court 
balances the intrusiveness of the search against its necessity).
217. Olsen, supra note 12, at 23-24.
218. See supra Section IV.B. 
219. See infra Section V.D (proposing specific limitations for Congress to 
impose on the TSA). 
220. Solomon, supra note 35, at 665 (asking Congress to set guidelines for 
the TSA and require promises that the TSA will respect privacy, but failing to 
provide examples of what guidelines Congress could specifically set to limit the 
TSA’s invasion of privacy or what an assurance that the TSA will respect privacy 
actually looks like in practice). For instance, the privacy officer must make sure that 
the TSA’s “use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections 
relating to the use . . . of personal information.” 6 U.S.C. § 142 (2006); see also
supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (explaining this requirement and how it 
impacts the TSA). While this is an admirable goal, it does not provide the TSA with 
specific guidance on how to protect privacy and leaves the privacy officer with a 
great deal of discretion. See 6 U.S.C. § 142. 
Enhancing Security While Protecting Privacy 1645
practically impervious to challenges by citizens due to the high 
degree of deference that the TSA would continue to receive from 
courts in carrying out its mandates.221 While Congress should indeed 
set guidelines, like requiring the TSA to explicitly consider the 
invasiveness of its measures,222 such vague guidelines are simply
insufficient to protect privacy and need to be supplemented by other, 
more clear directions to the TSA. The problem remains that the TSA 
has too little oversight for the vast amount of authority it has to 
invade individual privacy. Even though some of the TSA’s measures 
have been held constitutional,223 Congress should still play a more 
active role in limiting the TSA’s discretion in areas that so heavily 
invade personal privacy and dignity.
Although Congress cannot foresee every potential abuse of 
privacy in new technological developments, when threats are clear,
Congress should be ready and willing to do what it is able to do: 
protect Americans from gross invasions of privacy by the agencies it 
creates.224 While Congress cannot protect Americans from every 
threat, foreign or domestic, it ought not to stand idly by while the 
privacy of Americans is daily infringed upon without significantly 
enhancing safety.225 Although Benjamin Franklin’s warning that 
“‘[t]hose [who] would give up their liberty for security deserve 
neither and lose both’”226 is rather strong, at a certain point, the 
sacrifice of privacy and liberty for the sake of security becomes too 
great as the “benefits” of increased invasiveness hit levels of 
diminishing returns on the amount of safety gained. While the TSA 
was charged with increasing security at airports,227 surely Congress
did not intend that security come at any cost.228 However, since 
221. Olsen, supra note 12, at 22 (noting that under the wide deference given 
to agencies, the TSA’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, would 
not be overturned by the court, and the TSA’s actions would only be set aside if they 
were “‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law’” (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46301(d)(5)(C) (2006)).
222. See infra Section V.B (proposing that Congress require the TSA to 
explicitly balance the privacy costs of security measures against the security benefits 
of those measures). 
223. See supra Section II.B (discussing past cases where courts have found 
various airport security measures constitutional). 
224. See infra text accompanying note 235.
225. See infra text accompanying note 235.
226. Castillo, supra note 1 (paraphrasing Franklin, supra note 2).
227. 49 U.S.C. § 114(e), (f)(3), (f)(8) (2006).
228. For instance, Congress requires the TSA to make sure the costs of new 
security measures are not excessive in relation to the added security benefits they 
provide. Id. § 114(l)(3).
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security is still vitally important, some type of system must be 
worked out to both provide for security and protect privacy.
V. PROPOSED REFORMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
With all that past states,229 scholars,230 and the TSA have 
argued,231 a more satisfactory resolution to this debate is still needed. 
Although the TSA has properly responded in some areas, like using 
ATR on its AIT units,232 Congress should set more guidelines for the 
TSA to follow233 and also establish specific rules that are more clear-
cut.234 Overall, Congress should not abdicate its responsibility to the 
American people by handing its oversight responsibilities of the TSA 
over to courts, which afford great deference to the TSA.235
A. Prohibit Substantial Infringement on Privacy Rights
One possible solution to this dilemma is for Congress to amend 
the statute giving power to the TSA.236 Congress should add as a 
preface to the statute or within its more detailed provisions that the 
TSA must carry out its mandates “without substantially infringing on 
privacy rights.”237 Although “substantially” would be a term that the 
TSA and courts would have to interpret in the future, that qualifier is 
necessary to avoid stripping the TSA of all power, since all airport 
searches of passengers infringe on privacy at least minimally.238 For 
229. See supra Section IV.A (explaining the responses of several states to the 
TSA’s security measures).
230. See supra Section IV.B (providing examples of what different scholars 
have argued for and against the TSA’s security measures).
231. See supra Section III.D (explaining what the TSA has argued in support 
of its security measures). 
232. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (explaining when the TSA 
implemented ATR and when Congress required the use of ATR on all AIT units). 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 206, 213 (giving examples of a state 
and scholar asking Congress to provide more guidance and oversight to the TSA). 
234. See infra Section V.D (suggesting various specific actions that Congress 
could take to limit the TSA’s discretion and protect privacy). 
235. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (explaining the deference 
that courts generally give to agencies). 
236. That is, Congress could amend 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) by adding a 
subsection requiring that “the TSA must carry out its functions without substantially 
infringing on privacy rights.” Alternatively, Congress could add that clause as a 
preface to the whole statute. 
237. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3) (2006) (requiring the TSA to “develop 
policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security”).
238. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806-08 (2d Cir. 1974).
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instance, in United States v. Albarado, the Second Circuit found that 
a magnetometer involves a “minimal invasion of privacy” while a
frisk may be considered grossly invasive.239 Thus, under this 
standard, the TSA could use a magnetometer, but may not be able to 
use frisks, unless their invasiveness was limited in some way.
While courts currently apply a reasonableness test to these 
searches under the Fourth Amendment,240 adding this language to the 
statute does more than simply require the TSA to make sure that the 
security interests outweigh the privacy interests under the current 
reasonableness test. Such language would also limit the TSA’s
ability to infringe on privacy in situations where the TSA believes 
the security interests might outweigh the privacy interests. Hence, it 
would afford greater protections to privacy than are currently in 
place.241 Although this language would merely give guidance to the 
TSA that could potentially be argued away as vaguely complied 
with, it would also give challengers to the TSA’s security measures 
more teeth to their arguments that the TSA has gone too far and that 
Congress did not intend to give the TSA carte blanche in choosing 
methods to increase security.242 Further, this would enhance 
transparency and help the TSA explicitly analyze whether or not it is 
adopting measures that are “‘no more extensive nor intensive than 
necessary,’” as currently required by courts.243
B. Balance Privacy Invasions Against Security Benefits
Secondly, also within the statute creating the TSA, Congress 
should add to 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3), which currently requires the 
TSA to weigh the costs of its new security methods monetarily 
against the benefits in increased security, measured by the number of 
lives saved.244 Congress should add to the factors to consider in that 
statute by including an analysis of privacy versus increased security, 
measured by lives saved, similar to the analysis done when 
considering the costs of new regulations.245 Overall, this could be 
implemented as a broader cost–benefit analysis. On one hand would 
239. Id. at 806-07.
240. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
241. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
243. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
244. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3) (2006).
245. See id.
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be the monetary costs of implementing the new security measures, 
the privacy costs from the invasiveness of those measures, and the 
efficiency costs of those measures, while on the other hand would be 
the increased security benefits, measured by the value of the number 
of lives saved.
Since the TSA must already attempt to calculate the number of 
lives saved as a proxy for the security benefits of new measures, 
Congress could simply add to this provision and require that the TSA 
balance that security metric against the increased intrusion into 
privacy by new security methods.246 While it may be difficult for the 
TSA to calculate how invasive a measure is, it could conduct polls 
and surveys to help in this determination.247 Further, although it is 
difficult to measure the number of lives saved and their value,
Congress has already required the TSA, and other agencies, to use 
this as the metric for increased security.248
Moreover, although the TSA argues that it cannot reveal the 
weaknesses in its security measures, it could still provide an estimate 
for the number of lives that it believes are saved by its measures, as 
opposed to prior, less intrusive methods.249 With this number, the 
246. Id. (requiring that in considering new regulations, the TSA use as a 
factor “whether the costs of the regulation are excessive in relation to the 
enhancement of security the regulation will provide” and that the TSA measure the 
security of regulations by estimating “the number of lives that will be saved by the 
regulation and the monetary value of such lives”). 
247. See Stancombe, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing how invasive 
Americans believe the TSA’s security measures are by citing a poll where two-thirds 
of respondents supported AIT use while over half of respondents said pat-downs go 
too far); see also Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 
Fed. Reg. 18,287, 18,296 n.62 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 1540) (noting that various sources have conducted polls on acceptance of AIT); 
AIT: More Information, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/ait-more-
information (last modified May 20, 2013) (providing links to and summaries of polls 
on AIT acceptance). 
248. 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3) (requiring the TSA to calculate the security 
benefits of its security methods, measured by the value of the number of lives 
saved); see also How to Value Life? EPA Devalues Its Estimate, NBC NEWS (July 
10, 2008, 4:34 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25626294/#.UwYNWKXRlfM 
(explaining that agencies “weigh the costs versus the lifesaving benefits of a 
proposed rule”). Since agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
have placed a value on lives, this shows that it is feasible to calculate a value. See id.
For instance, the EPA valued a life at approximately $6,900,000 in 2008. Id. To 
calculate this amount, the EPA looked at “what people are willing to pay to avoid 
certain risks” and also “how much extra employers pay their workers to take on 
additional risks.” Id. Although the EPA reduced the value it placed on a life in 2008, 
it is still the agency with the highest value for a life. Id.
249. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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TSA could then choose an estimated value of a life and multiply the 
two figures. If this came out to be a value of $1 billion, then the TSA 
would weigh that against the monetary costs,250 privacy costs, and 
efficiency costs of the proposed measures. Even if people then 
disagreed with the TSA’s determination on this balance, the result 
would be greatly increased transparency on how the TSA made its 
decision. This would likely instill a greater feeling of trust that the 
TSA’s decision was not wholly arbitrary or without any 
consideration for privacy.
Although this balancing test is very similar to that used by 
courts in determining whether the administrative search is 
reasonable, this proposal would codify that test for the TSA.251 While 
this will still be an imprecise test, as most balancing tests are, it 
would provide another layer of protection for Americans252 by
requiring the TSA to explicitly consider privacy when it implements 
new security measures and to clearly document its analysis. This 
would provide a better record for the court to review and again arm 
those challenging the TSA’s actions. Overall, this would enhance the 
transparency of the TSA’s decisions upfront, rather than allowing the 
TSA to make decisions infringing on privacy and provide post hoc
justifications for them when challenged in court.253 Moreover, it 
would also provide a greater incentive for the TSA to consider 
privacy rather than just security.254
250. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (explaining the TSA’s 
estimated monetary costs of AIT in its NPRM).
251. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (balancing 
the necessity of a search in an airport against the offensiveness of the search 
method’s intrusion into privacy of passengers). 
252. See infra Section V.E (advocating a risk-based layered privacy 
protection approach).
253. Similar to this proposal to increase transparency on how invasive 
security measures are, Mark Scheid’s comment to the TSA’s NPRM on AIT called 
for the government to “be more vigorous before investing in new technology or 
procedures that may or may not effect the safety of our airports” and also “to 
support research to prove the efficacy of existing techniques and regulations, [so] 
that we can remove as much waste from the TSA as possible, in both capital and 
time.” Scheid, supra note 120. He stated that although he “understand[s] the desire 
to make air travel more secure, there needs to be greater scientific backing before 
one invades the privacy and restricts the freedom of the average citizen.” Id.
Therefore, the TSA should enhance transparency of the benefits of its security 
measures, the invasiveness of those measures, and its overall decisions on which 
measures to use. 
254. However, whether or not Congress implements this proposal, it should 
seriously consider removing the last part of 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3). Under this 
provision, “[t]he Under Secretary may waive requirements for an analysis that 
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C. Congressional or Presidential Approval of Body Scans and Pat-
Downs
Thirdly, Congress should amend the statute giving the TSA its 
power and mandates to require the TSA to submit new agency 
measures permitting the use of body scans or pat-downs to 
congressional approval.255 While the congressional process is rather 
cumbersome,256 this would centralize any public criticism of highly 
invasive methods on Congress.257 Moving the responsibility more 
estimates the number of lives that will be saved by the regulation and the monetary 
value of such lives if the Under Secretary determines that it is not feasible to make 
such an estimate.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3) (2006). Hence, the TSA can currently avoid 
the analysis of lives saved by determining that the estimates are not feasible. See id.
Since other agencies are able to estimate the value of a life, and since transparency 
should be enhanced in this area, Congress should remove this discretion in order to 
protect the integrity of this cost–benefit analysis. Id.; see also How to Value Life? 
EPA Devalues Its Estimate, supra note 248 (noting that the EPA has valued lives 
and also projected the number of lives saved by its regulations).
255. 49 U.S.C. § 114 (creating the TSA and establishing its mandates and 
powers). 
256. In order to enact a law, a bill must be passed by a majority of the House 
and Senate and also signed by the President. The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2014). In this process, there are many veto-gates where a bill can 
die and never become a law. See id. For instance, the committee could decide not to 
release the bill for a vote, one or both of the houses of Congress could vote against 
passing the bill, the conference committee may not be able to agree on a version of 
the bill for both houses to pass, the President may veto the bill, and the House and 
Senate may not have enough votes to override the veto. See id. Partly because this 
process is so long and arduous, Congress gives great power to agencies, which can 
act more quickly and with more public input. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process helps citizens have input into agency 
decisions). Further, although the notice-and-comment process is intended to bring 
the public’s voice into the discussion of new regulations, the TSA deliberately chose 
not to use this process with AIT. Id. at 5-6, 8 (requiring the TSA to issue an NPRM 
on its use of AIT, but otherwise holding AIT constitutional as part of an 
administrative search). It was only when the D.C. Circuit ordered the TSA to utilize 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, well after AIT had been implemented nationwide, 
that the TSA issued its NPRM and sought comments on it from the public. Id. at 8; 
Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287 
(proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). Hence, the TSA 
itself tried to avoid part of the purpose for its existence as an agency with the notice-
and-comment process. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 5-6. 
257. Even though Congress gives power to the TSA, the agency is still part 
of the executive branch under the Department of Homeland Security. 49 U.S.C. § 
114 (creating the TSA and establishing its mandates and powers); Department 
Components, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/department-
Enhancing Security While Protecting Privacy 1651
directly onto Congress in the minds of Americans would make 
Congress more thoughtful of the measures that it approves and 
ultimately would make the TSA’s security measures more responsive
to the will of the people.258
Alternatively, Congress could require the President to make a 
finding that a given security measure’s benefits, measured in the 
value of lives saved,259 outweigh its costs, measured both in 
monetary expenses and privacy costs.260 Congress could condition 
funds for the TSA’s security measures or condition permission for 
the TSA to use certain security measures on the President making 
this finding. Imposing such requirements would be easier than 
having Congress pass laws on specific methods the TSA wants to 
use.261 Further, this could be undone much more easily than passing 
another law through Congress, as the President could make another 
finding that the condition is no longer satisfied.262 Overall, this 
alternative would allow for the benefit of increasing the TSA’s
political accountability by centering attention for these decisions on 
the President. However, it could also have a danger of being too 
micromanaging over the agency, just as could be the problem with 
Congress making rules that are too specific.263 Even considering the 
potential disadvantages of the President or Congress taking a more 
active role, the advantages of increased accountability and greater 
protections for privacy are worth it.
components (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). Although citizens should blame Congress 
if they believe agencies have been given too much power, shifting the decision-
making back to Congress in a more direct manner would also result in people more 
directly understanding that Congress is responsible. 
258. See supra note 257 (explaining that Congress gives power to executive 
agencies).
259. See 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(3). 
260. Congress has done this in the past. HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CRS-98-611, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES: BACKGROUND AND 
OVERVIEW 12-13 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/98-611.pdf. For 
instance, Congress conditioned the continued sales of agricultural products based on 
the President finding that the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954 had been satisfied. Id. at 12. Similarly, under a 1974 amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, Congress forbade expenditures of Central Intelligence Agency funds 
until the President found that the intelligence activities were essential for national 
security and described the scope of these activities to the intelligence committees in 
Congress. Id. at 12-13. 
261. See supra note 256 (discussing the process for Congress to pass a law).
262. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
congressional process for enacting a law is rather cumbersome and therefore, hard to 
undo). 
263. See supra note 256.
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D. Specific Congressional Actions to Limit Privacy Invasions
Fourth, Congress should take specific actions to explicitly limit 
the TSA’s ability to invade privacy. For instance, Congress should 
take more actions like its statute requiring the TSA to use ATR on all 
AIT.264 This statute was very responsive to privacy interests and has 
taken away the TSA’s discretion in this area.265 It has explicitly 
removed a highly invasive option from the table for the TSA and 
greatly enhanced privacy protections, since ATR reduces the 
invasiveness of AIT by only generating a generic outline rather than 
a detailed image of a passenger.266 However, Congress should ensure 
that this new statute is being carried out by requiring the TSA to 
report back to Congress on its progress in complying with this 
statute.267
Along this same line, Congress should also require the TSA to 
remove all AIT units that have storage capacity.268 Although the TSA 
claims that it has disabled this capability on all AIT units currently in 
place, it is an unnecessary risk that someone could secretly re-enable 
this capacity and record passenger images.269 Further, as of now, the 
TSA is free to change its policy and use AIT with that storage 
capacity enabled, so long as it can justify the use and promise 
264. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)(1)(C), (l)(2)(A) (2012).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,287, 18,294 (proposed Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540) 
(stating that the TSA was supposed to be in compliance with this by June 1, 2013).
268. See Ellison & Pilcher, supra note 40, at 6-7 (explaining that AIT has the 
capacity to generate and store images of passengers); see also Norma Ballhorn, 
Comment to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: 
Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology (Federal Register 
Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (June 28, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-4758 (“To the extent [the] TSA continues the 
use of body scanners and pat-downs, the final rule should codify minimum 
protections, including guaranteeing individual passenger image data is not retained; 
that all physical searches are conducted by officers of the same self-identified 
gender; that secondary screening will be conducted in private at passenger’s 
election; that no passenger is required to expose sensitive areas under clothing to
display any item; that searches to resolve an anomaly are no more intrusive than 
necessary to resolve the anomaly; that screeners receive training on working with 
diverse populations; and that no traveler will be subject to discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity.”). 
269. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,294 (explaining the storage capability of AIT and the limits the TSA has 
placed on it). 
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sufficient safeguards to protect this private information.270 While the 
TSA currently restricts itself in this area, Congress should act now to 
prevent the use of this storage capacity in the future rather than 
waiting to react to new TSA security policies that Congress finds too 
invasive of privacy.271
Similarly, the TSA currently does not require children twelve 
years of age or under to pass through AIT.272 Rather, these children 
must go through a WTMD, unless their accompanying adult chooses 
otherwise.273 While the TSA currently uses this procedure, Congress 
should explicitly limit the TSA’s authority in this area so that it 
cannot change its policy with regard to children in the future without 
congressional approval. This would mitigate concerns about AIT 
becoming similar to child pornography.274
E. Risk-Based Layered Privacy Protection Approach
Overall, Congress should use a combination of these specific 
solutions and give more guidance to the TSA.275 Just as the TSA 
utilizes “a risk-based, layered security approach” to protecting 
Americans from security invasions by terrorists,276 Congress also 
ought to utilize a risk-based layered approach to protecting 
Americans from privacy invasions by the TSA. While one approach 
alone may not be sufficient to curb potential abuses, a combination 
of approaches could provide Americans with both necessary security 
and essential privacy.
270. 6 U.S.C. § 142 (2006) (requiring that “the use of technologies sustain, 
and do not erode, privacy protection relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of 
personal information”); see also supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (explaining 
this requirement and how it impacts the TSA). 
271. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,294. 
272. Id. at 18,297. 
273. Id. 
274. See The TSA and Full-Body Scanners. Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid., supra
note 133 (explaining that the United Kingdom struggled with using AIT on children 
because many likened it to child pornography).
275. See supra Sections V.A-D. 
276. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,291; see also supra text accompanying notes 102-03 (explaining what is 
included in the TSA’s layers of security). 
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CONCLUSION
Congress needs to exercise more thorough oversight and 
provide further limitations on the regulations imposed by the TSA. 
Congress should require greater security benefits from greater 
invasions of privacy and should not allow invasion of privacy 
beyond that which actually increases safety.277 Now that the TSA has 
issued its NPRM on AIT,278 it has been interesting to see the public’s
response on issues such as privacy concerns, health implications, and 
security effectiveness.279 If the TSA does not consider comments 
277. See Olsen, supra note 12, at 10 (arguing that many travelers currently 
must choose between not flying or undergoing screening that they “consider illegal, 
demeaning, and degrading” and commenting that the TSA believes any increased 
security from its new measures outweighs “the loss of individual liberty and 
privacy”). 
278. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,287. This NPRM was more about using AIT, which the TSA has already 
been doing, than about proposing the use of a new technology not yet in place. See
id. Whether or not the TSA issues a final ruling consistent with its proposed rule, all 
the analysis in this Note will still apply with the same force because Congress 
should still act in accordance with the proposed reforms to limit the TSA’s
discretion in the future. 
279. See, e.g., Anonymous, Comment to Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced 
Imaging Technology (Federal Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (July 15, 
2013), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-5532 
(“The removal of the back scatter machines has reduced my concerns about health 
issues. Incorporation of target recognition software has alleviated some of my 
privacy concerns so thank you. What I would like to address is the issue of efficacy. 
The current system has, to date, caught no terrorists. The most recent public tests 
show a 70% failure rate. This is old data but congressional testimony leads me to 
believe that current figures are not much different. The European Union is not using 
them citing 54% false positives. Even though your website lists a significant number 
of prohibited items confiscated, it is clear that a significant and larger number [of 
prohibited items] are flying with passengers regularly with no apparent affect. These 
are not comforting numbers and lead me to believe that this technology is not 
mature.”); David Nittler, Comment to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
Proposed Rule: NPRM: Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology 
(Federal Register Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-5544 (“The high-
resolution scanners are an invasion of privacy, are ineffective at finding dangerous 
items, and have unknown long-term health risks.”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 
Comment to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Proposed Rule: NPRM: 
Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology (Federal Register 
Publication), REGULATIONS.GOV (June 27, 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-4479 (commenting on the detrimental effect 
that AIT has on privacy, the TSA’s failure to sufficiently assess the health risks of 
AIT, and the TSA’s inadequate exploration of alternative security methods). 
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raising these factors in issuing its final rule, the TSA’s use of AIT 
could be subjected to further challenges in court.280
Most importantly, if the TSA does not demonstrate that AIT or 
full-body pat-downs actually increase security, then it would be hard 
for a court to find that the TSA is using measures that are “as limited 
as possible” to meet the purposes of security.281 Under this standard, 
when less intrusive measures are available that are no less effective 
than more invasive measures, it would not be constitutionally 
acceptable to choose the more invasive measures.282 While the TSA 
must follow the new statute requiring all AIT to be equipped with 
ATR, which decreases the invasion into privacy,283 Congress should 
continue this method of explicitly limiting the TSA’s discretion and 
also giving guidelines to the TSA284 in areas where the TSA could 
otherwise widely infringe on privacy rights without much 
accountability and with continued deference from the courts.285 After 
all, what is a life of security worth if that life is overrun with constant 
invasions of privacy by the very government created to protect 
American security and privacy? In light of this consideration, 
Benjamin Franklin’s admonition that “‘[t]hose [who] would give up 
their liberty for security deserve neither and lose both’” is a fitting 
call for further congressional action.286
280. See supra note 61 (explaining that under Administrative Procedure Act, 
an agency issuing its final rule must consider the comments received on its NPRM).
281. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (emphasis 
omitted).
282. Id.
283. 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)(1)(C), (l)(2)(A) (2012). 
284. See supra Part V.
285. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (explaining the vast 
deference that courts typically give to administrative agencies).
286. Castillo, supra note 1 (paraphrasing Franklin, supra note 2).

